New kid on the missile block

BRP Bhaskar
Gulf Today

Indian public opinion responded with a display of patriotic fervour last week as the country blasted its way into the elite club of countries with long-range missile capability by successfully test-firing the indigenously designed and built Agni V, with a range of 5,000 kilometres.

 “We are today a missile power,” said VK Saraswat, head of Defence Research and Development Organisation, which handles the Agni missile programme. Sections of the media interpreted it to mean the country now has the capability to fire an intercontinental missile.

China greeted the arrival of the new kid on the missile block with a quaint mix of sneer, suspicion and sobriety. The state-owned Global Times said India, swept up by missile delusion, apparently is hoping to enter the intercontinental ballistic missile club, although ICBMs normally have a range of over 8,000 km.

The newspaper quoted a researcher at the People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences as saying Agni V actually has the potential to reach targets 8,000 km away, but the Indian government is downplaying its capability to avoid causing concern to other countries.

“China and India should develop as friendly a relationship as possible,” the newspaper said. “Even if this cannot be achieved, the two should at least tolerate each other and learn to coexist.”

A 17.5m tall, solid-fuelled, three-stage vehicle with a launch weight of 50 tonnes, Agni V cost more than Rs 2.5 billion to build. It can carry a one-tonne nuclear payload.

India did not inform China in advance about the launch. But China was following developments closely. Its media carried reports on the launch preparations and took note of a day’s delay caused by bad weather.

Apart from China, parts of Europe and capitals as far apart as Tehran, Jakarta and Manila fall within the range of Agni V but there was hardly any criticism from the rest of the world.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation said it did not consider India a missile threat to its allies or territory. The United States responded with a call for restraint, addressed to all nuclear-capable states.

With the border dispute which led to a short war between India and China a half-century ago still unresolved, the relationship between the two countries remains uneasy. In view of China’s cosy relations with Pakistan, Indian defence planning takes into account the possibility of having to fight on two fronts at the same time. 

Pakistan’s response to Agni V was muted presumably because it makes little difference to the military balance between the two countries. Both countries possess intermediate-range nuclear-capable missiles and have thus been, in a sense, in a situation of mutual deterrence already.

Both China and India hiked up their defence budgets this year – China by 11.2 per cent to touch a record $106 billion, and India by 17.63 per cent to reach a new high of $39 billion. The huge gap between the outlays reflects the differing strategic perceptions of the two countries. 

China justifies its huge military spending, pointing out that it is only 1.2 per cent of its gross domestic product and is in keeping with its security environment and economic and social development. It already has a missile with a range of 13,000 km, which puts North America within striking distance.

India’s defence budget is about 1.9 per cent of its GDP. Military and strategic experts have been arguing it must be raised to three per cent to effectively deter both China and Pakistan. However, military spending of that order can be ruled out as it will hamper the country’s developmental efforts.

China knows that India is not seeking military parity with it and poses no threat to it. Its concerns actually stem from the fear of India’s possible involvement with the USA which has stepped up its presence in the Pacific.

India has cause for worry too. Its problem is not that it cannot match China’s military manpower and hardware but that it is heavily dependent upon outside sources for equipment. It is now the world’s largest importer of arms.

What India perceives as China’s arrogance and China terms India’s persecution mania are pointers to the psychological hurdles the two countries must cross before they can establish healthy bilateral relations. Close cooperation in a forum like BRICS, which includes, besides them, Brazil, Russia and South Africa, may help in this regard.  -- Gulf Today, Sharjah, April 23, 2012

Bid to enter Shanghai Group

BRP Bhaskar
Gulf Today

With India, Pakistan and Afghanistan lining up for membership, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a common platform of China, Russia and four Central Asian republics, is set to emerge as a regional body with increased clout.

Established in 2001, SCO member-states now cover a contiguous area of more than 30 million square kilometres spread over Asia and Europe with a population of nearly 1.5 billion. The South Asian countries’ entry will raise the area and double the population.

However, it is not area and population that will make the enlarged SCO a powerful institution but the region’s strategic significance. It will be a regional forum without the participation of any western nation, including the United States.

The tenth annual SCO summit, held at Astana, capital of Kazakhstan, last week laid down the norms for membership and negotiations for admission of India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia, all of whom are now observers. Iran’s entry has to wait as the SCO charter does not permit admission of a state facing United Nations sanctions.

There is no knowing how long the negotiation process will last but India is hoping the enlarged SCO will be in place before 2014, the deadline set for withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. The SCO is already playing a constructive role in that war-ravaged country and the inclusion of India and Pakistan will enhance its ability to ensure the country’s stability.

The Astana declaration, issued at the end of the summit, envisages a neutral Afghanistan. It was the erstwhile Soviet Union’s violation of its neutrality, which had been respected by the Tsar of Russia and the British rulers of the Indian subcontinent, that landed the landlocked country into the mess in which it is today.

Significantly, it points out that the Afghan problem cannot be solved through military measures alone and demands that attention be paid to social and economic issues, particularly reconstruction of transportation and social infrastructure.

Formal assertion of the principle of Afghanistan’s neutrality by the group, which includes both Russia and China, is significant in the context of reported US attempts to establish military bases there under cover of a defence shield before the planned pullout. It needs to be endorsed by Pakistan and India.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who attended the summit, asked the US to respect the country’s sovereignty. With civilian casualties in western air strikes on rebel forces on the rise, he has lately been talking of the risk of allies turning into an occupation force.

Condemning the US missile defence programme for the region, the Astana declaration says one-sided and unlimited development of such systems by one state or a small band of states can damage strategic stability and international security.

Western alarm over these formulations was reflected in media reports which projected the enlarged SCO as a rival to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which serves as an arm of the US. There have also been suggestions that the group is seeking dismantlement of the western bases in Central Asia and establishment of a security system without US participation.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, who was at the summit, did call for a security alliance of former Soviet republics and China against the west. However, there were no takers.

China dismissed western media reports as reflective of the mindset of the United States, which does not want anyone to challenge its position as the world’s policeman. Writing in the Communist Party newspaper, a commentator stated that the SCO charter casts no obligation on member-states to provide military assistance to one another.

However, the charter does not preclude military co-operation. The group’s proclaimed objectives include fighting the triple evils of terrorism, regional separatism and religious extremism. Since its inception 10 years ago the SCO has conducted as many joint exercises to fight terrorism, drug traffic and organised crime. Lately it has also turned attention to areas such as checking money laundering and ensuring security of major international activities.

India’s desire for full membership of the SCO stems from the hope that it can benefit from the group’s anti-terrorist programme. Such sentiments may be there in sections of the Pakistani establishment too. However, given the character of the terror groups operating in the two countries, there are limits to the benefit that can flow from it.

But there are economic and political dividends to look forward to. The SCO plans to become a free-trade area by 2020. By that time the movement towards a multipolar world may have also gained momentum. --Gulf Today, Sharjah, June 20, 2011.

Is an 'Asian NATO' on the US agenda?

Reproduced below is an article by Jose Miguel Alonso Trabanco, an independent writer based in Mexico specializing in geopoltiucal and military affairs.

by JOSE MIGUEL ALONSO TRABANCO
Global Research

There has been some talk concerning American intentions to forge an Asian NATO, i.e. a US led military alliance meant to advance its members' geopolitical interests in the region. During the Cold War, the US created the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which also encompassed France and the UK as well as regional pro-Western States such as Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines. However, such organization was dissolved in 1977.

Moreover, we also need to take into account the existence of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, better known to all as ANZUS. Both American allies fought together during the Vietnam War, the Gulf War and Operation Enduring Freedom (in Afghanistan). Canberra also supported and participated in the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, Australia is an important contributor to the National Missile Defense System. Therefore, one can practically take for granted that any potential Asian or Pacific version of NATO will include these two staunch American allies. Japan has become even closer to the US and an increased level of NATO-Japan dialogue indicates that both parties have agreed to strengthen its political and military links.

In order to assess if Washington is indeed attempting to establish an alliance in the Asia-Pacific region (more or less analogous to its Atlantic counterpart) one must examine what the American motivation could be. Some top American politicians have been promoting such plans. For example, Rudolph Giuliani proposed that NATO should accept Australia, Israel, India, Japan and Singapore. Perhaps it is also what Senator John McCain had in mind when he recommended the establishment of an American-led League of Democracies, an euphemism which means that non European US allies had to be included in a global military coalition (against whom? One could add).

As we will see, there are plenty of reasons the United States will be interested in creating any such organization. American senior geostrategists must have paid great of attention to:

• North Korea's nuclear program.

• The meteoric rise of China as an economic powerhouse. Or, as the US National Intelligence Council terms it, "the unprecedented transfer of wealth from West to East". China has already overtaken Germany as the world's third largest GDP. Beijing possesses the largest foreign currency reserves and the fact that most of them denominated in US dollars gives the People's Republic of China considerable leverage.

• Other regional economies have grown impressively, namely South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and Hong Kong. This means that Asia has been and will continue playing an increasingly important role in international politics.

• The emergence of China has also expanded the Middle Kingdom's military, geopolitical, diplomatic and technological power. China is arguably the greatest power in East Asia. Beijing is improving and modernizing its military hardware and it seeks to develop competitive sea power projection capabilities in the long run.
• China and Russia have become closer cooperative partners through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Both powers have agreed to share their influence in Central Asia and prevent American influence from reaching further into the Great Turkestan. Moreover, both have carried out joint military exercises.

• Beijing has courted several regimes openly hostile to American power. In fact China is the primary destination of Iranian oil exports and the idea of building an oil pipeline connecting both has been explored. Furthermore, Myanmar has become one of closest Chinese allies. The 'Middle Kingdom' is large importer of Myanmarese resources (fossil fuels, gems, timber and so on) and Myanmar's ruling junta has allowed the Chinese to open and operate intelligence facilities there. The PRC, in order to ensure supplies of raw materials has become a key trading partner of many African countries as well.

• The resurgence of Russia as a great power is important. The Kremlin has shown some interest in projects concerning the development of energy resources. For instance, in order to diversify its trading partners, Russia has seriously thought about providing fossil fuels to East Asia's largest economies (China, Japan and South Korea). Additionally, the Russian Federation plans to increase its share in East and Southeast Asia's arms markets.

• Even though South Korea still hosts a large number of US military personnel, Seoul (unlike Tokyo) has implemented a foreign policy which has been careful enough not to annoy Beijing.

• Although some American masterminded Color Revolutions were first successful in inciting regime change, it seems both the Chinese and the Russians have meticulously studied this Modus Operandi and Beijing was able to counter such methodology in Myanmar's Saffron Revolution and during the 2008 Tibet riots.
US top planners therefore have decided that America has to augment its presence in Asia if Washington is indeed committed to achieve American hegemony (a.k.a. 'The New American Century'). Washington has stationed troops in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Diego Garcia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Guam and Australia. Such military deployments, US policymakers seem to think, must be amplified through an Asian version of NATO.

The ultimate goal of an Asian NATO would be to prevent China from becoming a formidable challenging power. As a result, US strategists have concluded that America needs to preserve its position as the world's top sea power so that it retains the ability to control strategic sea lanes (like the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea) and to enforce a naval blockade in case war breaks out. The aforementioned means that Asian economies would have to make meaningful concessions to the US if they want to keep their flows of seaborne foreign trade uninterrupted.

As a result of the Iraqi and Afghan quagmires, it is argued that the US has understood that even if America is the world's leading power, it is still unable to unilaterally make its interests prevail. Thus, Washington has realized that it will need several allies to maintain its position unrivaled. So the Americans have been busy trying to deepen their strategic cooperation with traditional allies (Japan, Australia, New Zealand and so on). Moreover, the US has been attempting to seduce India and embed it into an Asian NATO, something that would dramatically alter the whole balance of power in Eurasia.

For the British Empire, India was its most prized possession because it was hugely profitable and, more importantly, its geographic position was strategically significant. According to the CIA World Factbook, India became the world's twelfth largest economy in 2008 thanks to its GDP growth. Moreover, India is strategically located in the southernmost part of the Eurasian landmass and its territory is considerably large. Furthermore Indian population is an important asset because the country has an internationally competitive professional class. Last but not least, it must not be forgotten that India has a stockpile of nuclear weapons.

It seems India has abandoned its Cold War foreign policy of nonalignment. Indeed, it looks like Delhi has been slowly moving towards the Anglo-American orbit and its allies. Some members of Indian political establishment are openly hostile towards China. For example, then Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes claimed China was "India's enemy No. 1". Such a statement confirms that at least some senior politicians in Delhi truly believe the People's Republic of China is some sort of strategic rival even though most of them do not openly express that viewpoint because of diplomatic repercussions.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is an Indian political force which, among other things, advocates a more aggressive foreign policy and it also supports a strongly nationalist agenda. If the 2008 Mumbai attacks were indeed a covert operation run by the CIA franchise called ISI (which has been resorted to in Chechnya, Afghanistan, the Balkans or wherever plausible denial is needed) one of its objectives would be the political empowerment of Indian forces (like the BJP) much more willing to accept an Indo-American alliance than the current Congress-led administration.

It is revealing that the Dalai Lama (who is still probably a CIA asset) keeps operating unimpeded from Dharamsala (nicknamed 'little Lhasa'), India, which demonstrates that Delhi is politically eager to check China's rising power. Moreover, India is also interested in gaining access to Tibet's abundant deposits of natural resources, particularly fresh water and uranium.

A few years ago, India was willing to engage Iran in negotiations in order to enhance its own energy security. It seems Washington was successful in undermining those talks. One can only wonder what Delhi was promised or given in return. It is also remarkable that the US plans a transfer of nuclear technology to India.

Furthermore, India has also sought closer ties with other American allies. For instance, Delhi has become a large buyer of Israeli-made arms and defence systems.
On the other hand, India is an observer State in the SCO. Yet, Delhi has not requested full membership, allegedly as a result of American diplomatic pressure. India is an important purchaser of Russian-manufactured military hardware, including aircraft and tanks. Besides, Russia and India are collaborating in the development of a fifth-generation stealth fighter.

Russia and India had a close relation during the Cold War. The Kremlin knows that both powers do not have mutually exclusive national interests, which is not something that can be said when one examines Sino-Indian relations. Moscow and Delhi share a desire to counter Islamic unrest in Central Asia. President Medvedev recently announced that the Russian Government will consider sharing nuclear technology with India to boost bilateral ties, an effort clearly meant to outbid the Americans.

In short, the Americans are very much interested in creating an 'Asian NATO'; nevertheless, such organization would be meaningless unless India could be included. That explains why the US has demonstrated a certain willingness to make several concessions to India in order to gain the latter's geopolitical and strategic loyalty. It is unknown at this point if Delhi will join such an alliance. Perhaps India's political elites are still deciding whether they will align with the Atlanticists (the Americans and the Europeans), with the Eurasians (the Russians plus the Chinese) or with neither. After all, Delhi can just play them off against one another in order to extract as many concessions as possible from both without having to take sides. However, if India opts to side with any of those bands, that will send strong geopolitical shockwaves throughout Eurasia. (Distributed by Countercyrrents.org)

José Miguel Alonso Trabanco has a degree in International Relations from the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Studies, Mexico City. His focus is on contemporary and historic geopolitics, the world's balance of power, the international system's architecture and the emergence of new powers.